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DRIV ER SAFETY AND MOTOR CARRIER PROFITABILITY: 
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ABSTRACT
The objective of the study was to quantitatively explore truck driver safety records in an effort to 
determine and classify various types of drivers. Six safety variables relating to the number of safety 
points each driver had accumulated were analyzed using a cluster analysis procedure on 368 active 
drivers. The results of the study identified three clusters of drivers. Over 49.3 percent of the drivers 
were identified in a cluster labeled as the “Best Drivers.” The label “Ticket Magnets” was given to 
23.6 percent of the drivers, and 27.1 percent of the sample was given the label “Accident Prone.” 
The individual clusters were also profiled on additional variables. The study findings indicate that 
most drivers are very good in all aspects of driver safety. Other drivers have some deficiencies 
which are addressed as managerial implications in the manuscript.
INTRODUCTION
At a time when companies are looking for ways 
to trim costs, many are seeking to limit layoffs 
and to preserve talent. Most will cut employee 
salaries, hours, and benefits, but they are 
concerned about preserving talent for the 
eventual economic recovery (Tuna, 2009). 
During the same time period, motor carriers 
have faced record high fuel costs and litigation 
attorneys eagerly eyeing trucking accidents as 
potential billing revenues, but until recently they 
have also faced the rapid turnover of drivers 
willing to move to a new motor carrier for 
almost no salary increases. How does 
management decide which drivers should be 
kept at all costs and which drivers should be 
allowed to leave if they so desire? Even in 
tough economic times, motor carriers strive to 
remain profitable and thus sustainable. Two 
issues are very relevant in a motor carriers' 
ability to remain profitable: the costs of 
replacing drivers and the costs associated with 
the consequences of unsafe drivers.
Drivers who shift from one carrier to another 
create additional costs as motor carriers have to
find, hire, and train new drivers to maintain their 
fleet. It requires additional training costs and 
often results in short-term service delays and 
other problems. These concerns all relate to 
lower carrier profitability. A variety of studies 
have been conducted to determine why drivers 
move from carrier to carrier, and what can be 
done to retain drivers. Most researchers agree 
that the issue is complex and critical to the long­
term success of trucking firms. The next logical 
step for a motor carrier is to determine which 
drivers have more desirable characteristics than 
other drivers and thus should receive more 
incentives and attention by management to keep 
them in the fleet.
Another key profitability issue related to drivers 
is their safety record. Safe drivers are less likely 
to involve the motor carrier in latent cost 
problems including litigation. For example, safe 
drivers, by definition, will be involved in fewer 
accidents and other incidents, resulting in fewer 
traffic violations, and more on-time deliveries. 
This makes safe drivers more valuable to a 
motor carrier than drivers who receive more 
citations and are involved in more safety-related 
incidents. In short, safe drivers allow carriers to 
be more profitable and thus are more valuable to
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the company. The most tangible indicator of 
how safe a driver is will be found in the safety 
record of the driver, which should be a part of a 
motor carrier’s database.
The purpose of the present study is to determine 
if natural groupings or segments of drivers exist 
in a motor carrier’s database safety records, and 
thus to identify the firm’s best drivers. Research 
questions to be answered include: what safety 
variables are relevant in determining more 
desirable drivers than those less desirable 
drivers, and what are other related characteristics 
of the best drivers in the fleet. By identifying 
the best drivers, companies can determine which 
drivers to expend the most effort and resources 
to retain. Such an approach should be based on 
data normally kept by motor carriers on their 
drivers. The development of such a 
methodology can help existing carriers more 
fully utilize their company databases to make 
informed driver retention decisions. The study 
examines data from a Midwestern motor 
carrier’s driver population database in an attempt 
to answer these relevant questions.
BACKGROUND LITERATURE
For any company to survive in the motor carrier 
industry the bottom line is profitability. A 
variety of issues relate to profitability for motor 
carriers, including maintaining a quality fleet of 
safe drivers and equipment, an organizational 
culture promoting high levels of safety, and 
being in compliance with the federal department 
of transportation motor carrier regulations. 
Therefore, this literature review will examine the 
issues of driver recruitment and retention, as 
well as driver safety. Driver safety issues as they 
relate to motor carrier profitability, and the use 
of carrier databases to classify drivers on a 
variety of safety issues will also be examined. 
Two key issues that relate to the quality and 
profitability of the drivers in a motor carrier’s 
fleet are driver turnover and retention, and the 
drivers’ past safety record.
Driver Turnov er and Profitability
Since the late 1980s one key issue facing the 
motor carrier industry has been the shortage of 
qualified drivers (Lemay and Taylor, 1989).
Only recently have drivers stopped jumping 
from one carrier to another as the economy has 
slowed and carriers have had less business 
requiring fewer drivers (Watson, 2008). While 
the economic situation has eased the driver 
turnover problem, the situation is not expected 
to last as it has been estimated that driver 
shortages will exist for the next ten years 
(American Trucking Association, 2005; Kilcarr, 
2005; Watson, 2008). As the economic recovery 
begins, carriers will again need more drivers, 
and driver retirements and fewer new drivers 
entering the industry will only magnify the 
problem. A concern for motor carriers is that 
they may have an excessive turnover of 
“desirable” drivers (Richard, et. al., 1994).
Driver Turnover Issues
Success in the trucking industry is closely 
related to the critical role played by drivers 
(McElroy et. al., 1993). Drivers are the essence 
of a motor carrier, and they represent the 
trucking industry to the public. They constitute 
the largest operating cost for any carrier’s 
operations, and as such they are the easiest way 
for a carrier to control costs (Stephenson and 
Fox, 1996). For nearly three decades there has 
been a shortage of drivers, which has allowed 
some drivers to move from one carrier to another 
with little concern about carriers. The term 
“churning” was coined by the American 
Trucking Association (Spillenger, 1997) to 
describe the phenomena. Early researchers 
believed drivers were leaving or moving from 
carrier to carrier because of low pay, being away 
from home for days at a time, and irregular 
schedules (Lemay, et. al., 1993), but later 
research revealed that drivers were often leaving 
one firm to go to another for little pay 
differences and similar working conditions 
(Richard et. al., 1995).
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Researchers have approached the problem from 
a variety of angles including: attitude 
congruence between drivers and management 
(Adam, 1979); the use of expectations theory to 
see if carriers were meeting the expectations of 
their drivers (Richard et. al., 1994), and use of 
relationship theory which specifically examined 
the interaction of the dispatcher and his or her 
drivers (Keller and Ozment, 1999a; 1999b). 
They argued that dispatchers who communicate 
well with drivers and provide them with respect, 
essentially treating them as customers, should 
have lower driver turnover levels than 
dispatchers who do a poor job of handling their 
drivers. Suzuki (2007) developed a modeling 
decision tool to help motor carriers determine an 
acceptable level of truck driver turnover; 
essentially stating that some rate of driver 
turnover was inevitable for every carrier and 
could be determined.
Costs of Driver Turnover to Motor Carriers
Replacing existing drivers has a negative effect 
on carrier profitability. Min and Emam (2003) 
have argued that profitability in the trucking 
industry has clearly been undermined by the 
driver shortage. The costs of attracting new 
drivers, and providing incentives to keep 
existing drivers has been very high, especially 
given the highly competitive nature of the 
deregulated trucking industry and its narrow 
profit margins. Driver costs to carriers become 
extreme when the company has to replace 
drivers. The cost to replace a single driver has 
been estimated to be anywhere from $3,000 to 
$12,000 (Richard et. al., 1994; Stephenson and 
Fox, 1996; Keller and Ozment, 1999a; 1999b).
Just as service marketers discovered it was more 
expensive to find new customers than to retain 
existing customers (Zurburg, 1994), motor 
carriers have also recognized the high costs of 
replacing their current drivers who choose to 
leave them for another carrier (Keller and 
Ozment, 1999a). Therefore, it is clearly in a 
motor carrier’s best interest to retain its best 
drivers. The relevant question then becomes,
how does a carrier determine which drivers are 
“quality” drivers before deciding how to retain 
them. Safe driving records are an important 
characteristic of a motor carrier’s best drivers.
As Stephenson and Fox (1996) have stated, 
“Companies must not tolerate unsafe driving 
practices by any driver, no matter how severe the 
driver shortage problem is.” High quality, 
desirable drivers help motor carriers remain 
profitable with lower accident rates, lower 
associated lawsuits, and lower insurance costs 
(Richard, et. al., 1994). These factors are all 
reflected in higher levels of motor carrier 
profitability.
Higher driver turnover rates have been shown to 
be associated with higher accident rates (Corsi 
and Fanara, 1988). Thus, carrier safety is related 
to driver turnover. Accidents result in insurance 
claims, bad publicity, higher insurance rates, and 
additional costs associated with litigation and 
negative legal judgments. Drivers who have 
longer tenures with a single motor carrier are 
thus more likely to help their carriers be 
profitable (Burning, 1989). As such their 
carriers should want to retain them in their 
fleets. Younger drivers are however needed for 
the future as old drivers retire or move to other 
carriers. The crux of the issue is that the only 
way young drivers can become better drivers is 
with good carrier training and driving 
experience. Thus the literature has indirectly 
again and again indicated that some drivers as a 
market have characteristics more desirable to 
motor carriers than do others. This would argue 
for the use of some type of classification 
approach to learn which drivers are more 
desirable than others, and would therefore justify 
higher expenditures to attract and retain them for 
the carrier.
Driver Safety and Motor Carrier Profitability
The importance of safety in the motor carrier 
industry cannot be understated. Essentially, 
almost every aspect of safety is related to 
company drivers in one form or another.
Besides driving loads from one point to another.
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drivers’ must be sure their equipment is in good 
operating condition, they must drive in a 
responsible manner, and they must represent the 
carrier to its customers. Yet some drivers may 
be more willing than others to stretch 
operational rules and policies.
Driver Safety
The past few years of slow growth, which has 
decreased motor carrier business and temporarily 
reduced the driver shortage, does provide 
carriers with an opportunity to evaluate the 
current drivers in their fleet and to determine 
which are more valuable than others. Thus 
motor carriers can evaluate existing fleet drivers, 
and thus decide which drivers they should make 
a more concentrated effort to retain. While the 
“churning” of drivers has been a major concern 
to motor carriers over the past 30 years, the 
retention of quality or “desirable” (Richard, et. 
al.,1994) drivers, who have a strong emphasis on 
safety, is also an important aspect of driver 
selection and retention. Therefore it is 
imperative for drivers to place a high level of 
importance on safety, and to realize their actions 
as drivers represent their employers to the 
public. Related to this issue is a feeling that 
drivers must understand that when they are on 
the road they are responsible not only for their 
safety and the safety of their carrier, but also for 
the safety of the general public as well (Roetting 
et. al„ 2003).
Prior research has indicated that the main causes 
of most commercial vehicle-related accidents are 
driver-related factors (Beilock, 1995; Lantz and 
Loftus, 2005). Equally relevant is the 
importance management places on safety and 
how drivers internalize safety (Arboleda, et. al., 
2003). It is generally believed that drivers are 
viewed as being the motor carrier to the general 
public; and thus, carrier safety is synonymous 
with driver safety given that 95 percent of all 
carrier accidents are related to driver actions 
(Dole, 1991).
Motor carriers, therefore, have both an ethical 
and an economic obligation to hire and retain the 
safest, most qualified drivers. Mejza and his 
colleagues (2003) indicated that prior research 
efforts have pointed to driver selection as an 
important activity that might affect driver 
performance. A variety of negative outcomes for 
the motor carrier related to poor driver safety 
include: liability lawsuits related to driver 
accidents, higher insurance carrier premiums, 
more worker compensation claims for injuries 
by on the clock drivers, lower public image 
perceptions of the carrier, and lower company 
productivity levels. Driver safety characteristics 
also play an extremely important role for on time 
deliveries, damage losses, insurance rates, and 
the ultimate profitability of the company 
(Richard et. al., 1994). It would therefore seem 
logical that one of the most important issues to 
motor carriers is the retention of their best 
drivers (Keller and Ozment, 1999; Richard et. 
al., 1994).
A number of researchers have examined the 
potential effects of variables on driver safety. 
They include the effects of government 
regulations, such as hours of serv ice, etc. (Corsi 
et. al., 1984; Saltzman and Belzer, 2002; 
Hanowski et. al., 2007; Chen, 2008); and carrier/ 
dispatcher scheduling practices (Beilock, 1995; 
Braver et. al., 1999; Lemay et. al., 1993;
Morrow, 2002); but the bottom line still resides 
in the actual safety records of the individual 
drivers.
Mejza, Bernard, Corsi and Keane (2003) 
surveyed the safest motor carriers in the United 
States. They concluded that the safest motor 
carriers emphasized pre-service and in-service 
training for both drivers and owner-operators.
The training covered many topics and the drivers 
were evaluated using a variety of methods. 
Finally, the safest carriers provided their safe 
drivers with an array of different types of 
rewards. In essence, drivers of the safest carriers 
were aware of the level of importance placed on 
safety by their companies. As such, motor
10 Journal of Transportation Management
carriers with pre-service and in-service training 
for their drivers should, in theory, create the 
safest drivers found in their respective fleets.
More research effort should be undertaken to 
understand how carriers can identify their best 
drivers. As stated by Stephenson and Fox (1996) 
“Companies need to focus on retention of quality 
drivers as a long-range strategy to enhance 
corporate profitability.” Lower quality drivers 
can lead to increased costs to Anns in the form 
of operations difficulties, service problems for 
shippers, and other hidden costs due to safety 
issues such as down time due to accidents and 
higher reliability insurance rates (Richard et. al.,
1994) . Profitability remains a major concern to 
motor carriers in the highly competitive, 
deregulated, motor carrier industry.
Driver Safety and Profitability
Motor carrier safety is perhaps the most 
important consideration related to motor carrier 
profitability and sustainability (Corsi and Fanara, 
1988). Safety as it relates to profitability is an 
important factor, because to some degree it is 
controllable, while fuel costs and other variables 
are generally not controllable. Driver training 
can help to maintain higher safety standards and 
lower overall operating costs. A driver’s attitude 
toward safety is also an important consideration, 
but the most tangible indicator is likely to be the 
safety record of the driver. This should be an 
important part of any motor carrier’s database.
It has been reported that a large proportion of 
motor carrier accidents are the responsibility of a 
small number of drivers (Murray and Whiteing,
1995) . The Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA, 2008) has estimated 
that for a motor carrier to pay for a $25,000 
accident, it would be required to generate an 
additional $1,250,000 in revenue, assuming an 
average profit of only 2 percent. It has also been 
reported that in “2005 dollars,” the average cost 
per truck crash from 2001 to 2003, was $91,112 
(Miller et. ah, 2006). Direct expenses include
actual costs to replace equipment and personnel, 
medical expenses, higher insurance premiums 
and potential litigation expenses. Indirect costs 
include lost clients, lost sales, poor public 
relations/ publicity, and increased public 
relations costs (FMCSA, 2008). Both direct and 
indirect cost situations are related to lower levels 
of profitability and thus are detrimental to the 
long-range success of the carrier. It is clearly in 
the best interests of a motor carrier who wants to 
be profitable not to retain unsafe drivers.
Richardson (1994) indicated that lower profits 
related to drivers are associated with operation 
difficulties, service problems and other hidden 
costs. These problems are often due to safety 
issues linked to down time resulting from 
accidents and higher liability insurance rates. 
Besides the direct costs related to carrier 
accidents, indirect costs in the form of lost 
clients, lost sales, and poor publicity are also 
serious carrier concerns (FMCSA, 2008). Other 
driver safety factors involve costs associated 
with items damaged in transit, vehicle inspection 
problems, moving vehicle citations, and even 
complaints called in by the public about a driver. 
All of these variables may be useful in 
understanding differences between the safest 
drivers and other less desirable drivers. As a 
relatively controllable dimension, safety should 
be an important consideration to motor carriers 
in the selection and retention of drivers.
Carrier safety and profitability are related 
constructs when emphasized by management. 
Previous research has examined this relationship 
often positing that as financial conditions 
decrease so does safety performance. Research 
conducted by Corsi, Fanara, and Roberts (1984) 
reported a positive relationship between accident 
rates and the use of owner-operators. Chow and 
his colleagues (1987) found that a carrier’s 
safety performance was related to the carrier's 
financial condition, in that less was spent on 
safety and maintenance of equipment as a 
carrier’s financial position disintegrated. These 
findings were supported by Bruning’s (1989)
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research when he reported that a carrier’s 
accident rate was inversely related to its 
profitability. He also reported that a firm’s 
accident rate was inversely related to a driver’s 
tenure with the carrier. This is consistent with 
Corsi and Fanara’s (1988) finding that higher 
driver turnover rates were associated with higher 
accident rates. Once again, safety is related to 
driver retention.
Motor Carrier Database Strategies to 
Improve Safety and Profitability
Database management has been touted as the 
next logical step in the analysis of motor carrier 
safety information. As such, researchers have 
argued that databases can be useful in managing 
safety. Murray and Whiteing (1995) were early 
proponents of employing accident databases as a 
way to help reduce motor carrier accidents.
They argued that accident reduction strategies 
could operate at two levels: the national policy 
level and at the individual company level. Both 
strategies exist, as the federal government's 
Department of Transportation keeps data on 
motor carrier audits and roadside vehicle 
inspections including specific directives related 
to truck driver hours of serv ice regulations. 
Safety reports also include accident reports, so 
carriers could use carrier databases to 
systematically analyze accident levels, as well as 
their causes and costs. It is likely that at the 
individual company level, the safest firms likely 
maintain in-depth databases containing safety 
and compliance data for both the firm and for 
the individual drivers in their fleet. Murray and 
Whiteing (1995) argued that by employing a 
systematic database strategy, motor carriers 
could examine both human elements and vehicle 
management issues to reduce commercial 
vehicle accidents.
Moses and Savage (1996) developed and tested 
a methodology for predicting the safety 
performance of motor carriers based upon the 
U.S. government’s audit of carrier management 
safety practices and roadside safety compliance
inspections. Specific carrier characteristics were 
also studied. The study examined 20,000 
carriers in an attempt to identify the most 
dangerous firms so government agencies could 
prioritize which companies to target for 
educational programs and enforcement actions. 
The most dangerous firms they identified were 
generally small, for-hire companies, which is 
consistent with Corsi, Fanara, and Roberts 
(1984) previous findings. They also concluded 
that those dangerous carriers who rated low on 
both audits and roadside inspections have 
significantly higher accident rates, even though 
they comprised only about 10 percent of the 
sample.
In a 2003 study, Mejza and his colleagues 
conducted a large survey of the safest motor 
carriers in the United States. The results of the 
study indicated that: (1) the safest firms have a 
standard, consistently-applied screening criteria 
to use in hiring drivers; (2) both company- 
drivers and owner-operator drivers receive 
important pre-service and in-service training; (3) 
their training programs are comprehensive and 
drivers are evaluated using a variety of methods; 
and (4) safe drivers are rewarded in a variety of 
ways to support their efforts. In essence, the 
safest motor carriers, with high compliance and 
safety records, have a safety strategy they 
constantly monitor to ensure they remain 
effective in implementing a culture of 
organizational safety. The researchers’ study 
implied, “that driver selection could impact the 
carrier’s driver performance if drivers w ith 
certain characteristics are not selected” (Mejza 
et. al. 2003). Database usage would be a logical 
and important management tool for individual 
carriers interested in retaining drivers 
demonstrating high levels of safety performance.
The use of data mining technology to profile 
truck drivers as a way to identify and develop a 
driver recruitment and retention strategy was 
proposed and demonstrated by Min and Emam 
(2003). They sent a mail survey to 3000 
American motor carriers and received 422 valid
12 Journal of Transportation Management
responses for a response rate of 14.14 percent. 
They applied a data mining procedure to the data 
set and drew four conclusions from their results. 
The first conclusion was that smaller firms 
having less than 50 drivers were better able to 
retain their drivers when compared to larger 
firms. Second, drivers who had been with a firm 
less than six years were more likely to leave than 
drivers who had been with the firm for over six 
years. Third, unionized or full-time drivers were 
less likely to leave than were non-unionized or 
part-time drivers. Finally, drivers with limited 
driving experience, less than six years, were 
more likely to leave than were other drivers. 
Likely because they have less invested in a 
specific carrier and the cost of switching was 
low.
Based upon the driver profiles they developed, 
they suggested that carrier firms should 
formulate some type of recruitment and retention 
strategy based upon a multitude of attributes 
including “a driver’s demographic profile (e.g. 
age), longevity, prior driving experiences, union 
status, and the trucking linn's organizational 
settings.” Driver safety perfonnance variables in 
a carrier’s database provide hard evidence of 
past safety records for drivers.
Lantz and Loftus (2005) argued for the 
importance of developing and implementing a 
driver safety history indicator into the federal 
roadside selection system to target unsafe 
carriers. Like previously reviewed research, this 
suggestion argues for improved carrier safety at 
the national policy level. While other studies 
have also employed a macro approach, 
examining many carriers and drivers, no 
published studies have examined the database of 
a single large motor carrier. From a managerial 
perspective, this micro approach would allow 
single motor carriers to examine the drivers in 
their individual firms. The present study 
presents such an approach.
The present study argues that the carrier can 
actually employ database information to better 
understand the driver’s in the fleet. Most of the
previous studies have examined safety 
characteristics from a macro approach. The 
present study will be a micro approach using the 
existing database of a single motor carrier and its 
drivers. Most carriers will collect and retain 
needed information for their own needs as well 
as to be in compliance with government 
regulations. As Murray and Whiteing (1995) 
indicated, the use of a simple accident database 
to monitor and analyze the causes of carrier 
vehicle accidents can benefit individual 
companies. Accurate and complete management 
database information is clearly important in 
understanding how to reduce motor carrier 
accidents, as well as which drivers are higher 
“quality” drivers, and thus more attractive to 
retain should they decide to leave. This concept 
is consistent with Stephenson and Fox’s (1996) 
earlier described belief that motor carriers 
should retain “quality” drivers tempered by the 
concern for safety in their statement that 
“Companies must not tolerate unsafe driving 
practices by any driver, no matter how severe the 
driver shortage problem is.”
Market Segmentation and Database Usage
Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) commitment-trust 
theory of relationship marketing led to a variety 
of marketing studies approaching employees as 
internal customers (Berry, 1981; George, 1990; 
Gronroos, 1981, 1990; Taylor and Cosenza,
1998). In a previously discussed study of ways 
to retain drivers, Keller and Ozment (1999a, 
1999b) applied the theory to examine the 
relationship between dispatchers and drivers, 
concluding that drivers could be viewed as 
“internal customers who may be marketed to as 
firms traditionally market to customers.” Their 
application expanded the use of the theory to 
motor carriers and indicated that motor carriers 
should consider looking at their employees as 
internal customers if they desire to retain them.
An important basic marketing approach 
associated with organizations and their markets 
is segmentation theory (Haire, et. al., 1995).
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Segmentation theory argues that natural 
groupings of consumers may exist in a market or 
population. Each segment will have different 
characteristics, wants, and needs when compared 
to other segments. As such the firm can select 
those segments it wants to target for its 
customers, based upon a match of the company’s 
strengths and abilities to profitably service the 
selected segments. Organizations often classify 
and segment their markets based upon 
characteristics that will allow them to better 
identify and serve subpopulations of the total 
market. Businesses have segmented their 
markets based upon a variety of variables 
including: demographics, psychographics, 
attitudes and customer-relevant benefits.
Using a similar analogy, motor carriers looking 
at their population of drivers as an internal 
market might choose to better understand driver 
differences through segmentation theory. By 
segmenting internal driver markets, carriers 
might better understand different natural 
groupings of drivers to help them decide which 
individuals are “quality” drivers that they would 
want to retain at all costs, while other driver 
segments might not be as important to retain due 
to safety considerations. A motor carrier 
example would be TL and LTL motor carriers, 
who have decided they can best serve their 
respective markets using different approaches. 
Thus a logical extension of both theories is the 
use of segmentation techniques to better 
understand and explain differences in internal 
motor carrier customers (i.e. drivers). The 
purpose of the present study is to examine the 
segmentation concept and how it can be applied 
by motor carriers in their efforts to retain their 
best drivers.
Motor carriers can theoretically segment their 
market of fleet drivers using the information 
they have on each driver in their databases. 
Especially relevant database information would 
be driver safety data. Segmentation techniques 
can thus help motor carriers decide which 
drivers in their fleets are helping them to meet 
their organizational goals of profitability and
sustainability using safety and other types of data 
in their databases. The present study will 
demonstrate a segmentation approach for a large 
Mid-western motor carrier to examine its fleet of 
drivers from a safety perspective.
METHODOLOGY
Driver data for the study were provided by a 
Midwest-based motor carrier that has a 
combination of owner-operators and company 
drivers. Data were provided on the Midwest 
trucking company’s drivers. Specific data 
included their identification (unit) number, their 
addresses, age, gender, number of children, 
education level, marital status, race, location of 
residence type, division, seat classification, 
whether they were Hazardous Materials 
certified, the number of jobs they had in the last 
three years, whether they were graduates of the 
local national trucking corporation’s driver 
school, and their longevity in months with the 
company. Data were also provided for each 
trucker’s number of service failures, number of 
loads hauled, total revenue, and fuel mileage. 
Specific safety variables included accident 
points, cargo damage points, citation points, 
incident report points, inspection problem 
points, and motorist call-in complaint points 
(MOTO). These were added to provide a total 
safety point total. A total of 368 cases were 
provided for examination. A demographic 
profile of the truckers in the study is presented in 
Table 1.
The data base was dominated by male drivers, 
comprising over 90 percent of the sample.
Nearly 73 percent of the database was 
Caucasian, followed by nearly 20 percent 
African American, over four percent Hispanic 
Americans, and just over three percent were 
classified in the “other” category. Over 41 
percent of the drivers lived in urban areas, nearly 
32 percent were from suburban residences, and 
over 26 percent lived in rural areas. The 
demographic findings were considered 
representative and acceptable for the purposes of 
the study.
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TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MOTOR CARRIER DRIVERS
Frequencies Percentage
1. Gender
Male 333 90.5
Female 35 9.5
2. Race
Caucasian 268 72.8
African American 72 19.6
Hispanic American 16 4.3
Other 12 3.3
3. Residence Location
Urban 153 41.7
Suburban 117 31.9
Ruran 97 26.4
FINDINGS
The six safety variables relating to the number of 
points each driver had accumulated were 
initially analyzed using a cluster analysis 
procedure. The first variable measured the 
number of points accumulated by the driver due 
to accidents, the second variable were points 
acquired by the driver for items damaged in 
transit within the trailer, the third variable 
counted citation points for tickets received by 
the driver, and the fourth safety variable 
measured incident points (for example incidents 
occurring in the loading areas without formal 
reporting to law enforcement). The fifth variable 
was inspection points where the driver’s vehicle 
had violations at inspection checkpoints, and the 
final variable was accumulated points from 
motorists who called the trucking company to 
report bad driving by the driver. The larger the 
number of accumulated points in each category, 
the more negative the driver was in that 
category.
Ward’s clustering algorithm was employed with 
squared Euclidian distance measures to analyze 
the data. The resulting clustering criterion 
scores, and a visual examination of the resulting 
dendogram, indicated that a three-cluster 
solution should be selected for further testing 
and analysis. Discriminant analysis was next 
performed to determine how well the three 
clusters discriminated between the six original 
safety variables and to interpret the meaning of 
the three groups. Tukey tests were also 
conducted to determine exactly which cluster 
members were significantly different from other 
cluster members on each of the six safety 
variables. The results of that analysis are 
presented in Table 2. It should be noted that no 
significant differences were detected for any 
cluster solutions for Cargo points, the second 
safety variable. It would appear that this 
variable has very little variance across the 
clusters of drivers. It is also a variable that the 
driver may have less control over, given that as
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drivers they do not load the trailers, they simply 
move the trailers from one geographic location 
to another. Demographic and other variables 
were also examined across cluster membership 
to profile each cluster. The significant findings 
are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Cluster 1
The first cluster was the largest group and 
consisted of 169 drivers. This represented 49.3 
percent of the sample. Members of this cluster 
were given the label of “Best Drivers.” These 
respondents had very low accident points when 
compared to drivers from the other two clusters. 
Tukey tests showed that all three groups were 
significantly different from each other on this 
variable. As previously stated, no significant 
differences were found between the three 
clusters on cargo damage points. Members of
Cluster 1 also had the a low number of citation 
points, which were significantly lower than those 
drivers in Cluster 2, but not for drivers in Cluster 
3. Cluster 1 was significantly lower in incident 
reports when compared to the other two clusters. 
While drivers in Cluster 1 did not have the 
lowest overall inspection point means, they were 
significantly lower than drivers in Cluster 2, but 
not significantly different than drivers in Cluster 
3. On the final variable of motorist’s call 
complaints, drivers in Cluster 1 again had the 
lowest mean score, which was statistically lower 
than the scores from Clusters 2 and 3.
Cluster 2
Eighty-one drivers, 23.6 percent of the sample, 
were assigned to the second cluster. They were 
given the label of “Ticket Magnets” because of 
the high average numbers they received for
TABLE 2
CLUSTER INTERPRETATION OF WARD’S 3 GROUP SOLUTION 
OF TRUCKER SAFETY VARIABLES
Cluster
1. Best
Overall
Drivers
2. Ticket 
Magnets
3. Accident
Prone
Overall F-Ratio Sig.
1. Accident Points 1.84 6.93 18.60 7.58 235.80 .000
2. Cargo Points .92 .99 1.02 .96 .08 .923
3. Citation Points .75 2.1 .82 1.09 8.39 .000
4. Incident Points .82 11.0 2.0 3.55 188.17 .000
5. Inspection Points 1.36 8.73 1.05 3.02 85.44 .000
6. MOTO .19 .51 .37 .32 9.70 .000
n=169 n=81 n=93 N=343
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citation, incident, inspection, and motorist 
complaint points. While they were slightly 
under the overall average for all drivers’ accident 
points, members of this cluster had significantly 
more points than drivers in Cluster 1, but 
significantly fewer accident points than drivers 
in Cluster 3. Cluster 2 drivers had significantly 
more citation points than members of the other 
two clusters. They also had significantly higher 
means for incident points and inspection points 
when compared to the scores of drivers in 
Clusters 1 and 3. Drivers from Cluster 2 had the 
highest average of motorist call-in complaints, 
which was statistically higher than the average 
for Cluster 1, but not for Cluster 3.
Cluster 3
The last cluster was comprised of 93 drivers, or 
27.1 percent of the sample. The label of 
“Accident Prone” was given to this driver 
segment. Drivers in this cluster were 
distinguishable from drivers in the other two 
clusters based upon their high mean score for 
accident points. The average score for accident 
points was significantly higher for this group 
when compared to the other two clusters. This 
group also had the largest mean score for cargo 
points, but as previously stated, it was not 
significantly different from drivers in the other 
two groups. Citation points for Cluster 3 drivers 
were below the average for the overall drivers’ 
mean scores, significantly lower than Cluster 2 
drivers, but not Cluster 1 drivers. The same 
pattern held for incident points. Drivers in 
Cluster 3 had the lowest mean score for 
inspection points, which again was significantly 
lower than drivers in Cluster 2 but not for 
drivers in Cluster 1. Finally, Cluster 3 drivers 
had slightly above average mean scores for 
motorists’ complaints which were not 
significantly different from Cluster 2 driver’s 
scores, but significantly higher than drivers in 
Cluster 1.
Profiling Other Characteristics Across the 
Three Driver Clusters
Table 3 provides a profile analysis of other 
metric demographic and service variables not 
originally employed to create the three driver 
clusters. Seven variables were analyzed in the 
Table. Three variables were statistically 
significant (p<.05), two variables had practical 
significance (p> .05 but < . 10), and two other 
variables did not differ across the three clusters.
Measured in months, the mean longevity scores 
of the drivers working for the company was 
statistically different across the three driver 
segments. The drivers in Cluster 1, the “Best 
Drivers,” had a significantly higher mean score 
(41.45 months) with the company when 
compared to the drivers in Cluster 2 (33.07 
months) and drivers in Cluster 3 (32.99 months). 
There was no statistical difference between the 
means for drivers in Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 on 
this variable.
The second variable, the average age of drivers, 
was not significantly different across the three 
clusters. Variable 3 examined the number of 
jobs held by the drivers over the last three years. 
Mean scores on this variable were also not 
statistically significant across the three clusters. 
All drivers had held approximately three jobs in 
the last three years.
Variable 4, number of service failures, was not 
significant at the .05 level, but was close with a 
probability of .056. It is examined as having 
practical significance. Drivers in Cluster 1 had a 
lower mean average (1.18) of service failures 
when compared to drivers in Cluster 2 (1.89) 
and in Cluster 3 (1.78). This finding is related 
and similar to the average percentage of serv ice 
failures across the three groups. Again, the 
average number of serv ice failures was visibly 
lower for the best overall drivers in Cluster 1 
when compared to drivers in the other two 
clusters. The number of loads hauled, Variable 
5, provided results similar to those found for
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TABLE 3
CLUSTER PROFILING OF WARD S 3 GROUP SOLUTION 
ON TRUCKER SAFETY VARIABLES
Cluster
1. Best
Overall
Drivers
2. Ticket
Magnets
3. Accident
Prone
Overall F-Ratio Sig.
1. Longevity in Months 44.95 37.27 37.07 41.00 5.74 .004
2. Age 41.99 40.43 42.52 41.77 .980 .377
3. Jobs in 3 years 3.01 3.10 3.30 3.11 .783 .458
4. Service Failures 1.18 1.89 1.78 1.51 2.911 .056
5. Loads Hauled 498.1 434.95 430.90 464.77 4.386 .013
6. Total Revenue 695,302.06 586,346.18 575,534.09 636,787.44 6.317 .002
7. Percent Service 
Failures
.0025 .0043 .0035 .0032 2.700 .069
n=169 n=81 n=93 N=343
Variable 4. Drivers in Cluster 1, the best overall 
drivers, hauled a significantly larger average 
number of loads than drivers from Cluster 2 and 
Cluster 3. Related to this finding, drivers in 
Cluster 1 had significantly larger mean total 
revenue, Variable 6, when compared to drivers in 
the other two clusters. While only practically 
significant with a p-value of .069, the percent of 
service failures found in Variable 7, showed that 
the drivers in Cluster 1 again had the lowest 
percentage of service failures, followed by 
members of Cluster 3 and then Cluster 2.
Finally, Table 4 looks at two contingency tables 
across the three cluster segments. The first 
examined whether any differences exist across 
the clusters related to whether the drivers were 
certified to handle hazardous materials.
Practical significance for the Chi Square test 
(p=.090) indicated that 46.7 percent of the 
drivers from Cluster 1 were hazmat trained,
while drivers from Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 
respectively had only 38.3 percent and 33.3 
percent of drivers who were hazmat trained. The 
second contingency table reflected whether 
drivers from the three groups had received their 
training from the local motor carrier affiliated 
trucking school or whether they had received 
their driver training from another organization. 
Again, the findings had only practical 
significance with a significance level of .081. 
Drivers in Cluster 1 were nearly equally divided 
as to where they had received their training, 
while drivers from Clusters 2 and 3 were more 
than twice as likely to have received their 
training from the local trucking school.
DISCUSSION
The present study has employed marketing 
segmentation theory associated with the belief 
that differences in the drivers of a motor carrier
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can be identified and organized into groups by 
employing existing company data base 
information related to driver safety and other 
descriptive variables. Cluster analysis assumes 
that natural groupings of objects or individuals 
exist in a population. This is a logical 
assumption for a motor carrier’s fleet of drivers, 
as Richard et. al. (1994) and Stephenson and Fox 
(1996) have indicated that some drivers are more 
desirable than others. If carriers treat their 
drivers as customers to establish better 
understanding and long-term relationships, they 
are in effect looking to meet the needs of their 
drivers. The application of cluster analysis to a 
large Midwestern motor carrier’s driver safety 
database was successfully employed to identify 
the existence of three segments of drivers.
The first cluster was given the name “Best 
Overall Drivers’’. This segment represents the
best quality drivers in the carrier’s fleet. They 
are dependable, they avoid accidents, as well 
tickets and other citations. Even though they 
present no problems for their employers, they 
still should be offered any additional training 
and safety programs. These will probably be the 
drivers most likely to appreciate and use new 
safety technologies as they become available, as 
they have the largest number of months invested 
in the carrier. Related to these drivers’ positive 
contributions to the motor carrier’s profitability 
is the need to continually recognize drivers in 
this segment and to reward them. These are 
drivers who have generally been with their 
carrier for a long period of time (Bmning, 1989; 
Min and Emam, 2003). The drivers in this 
segment are the best drivers in the fleet and 
carrier management should consider all 
alternatives and incentives to keep them driving 
for the company.
TABLE 4
CROSS TABULATIONS OF VARIOUS DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
ACROSS 3 TRUCKER CLUSTERS
Cluster
1. Best
Overall
Drivers
2. Ticket
Magnets
3. Accident
Prone
ChiSquare Sig.
1. HazMat Certified
4.81 .090
Yes 79 31 31
No 90 50 62
2. Truck School Graduate
5.023 .081
Local School 84 52 54
Other School 85 29 39
n=169 n=81 n=93 N=343
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As Keller and Ozment (1999a; 1999b) and 
others have indicated, dispatchers and other 
company employees must do a good job 
communicating and managing the company’s 
drivers. The relationship is symbiotic for both 
parties as the drivers recognize the carrier is 
interested in their needs, and the carrier can 
identify and implement strategies to retain the 
highest quality drivers so as to to be more 
profitable. Surprisingly, those drivers who were 
in the best driver category were the least likely 
to have been trained by their current employer. 
This may be related to the fact that drivers in the 
best overall driver category are older and likely 
had good driving experiences before they were 
employed by their current carrier. Another 
possibility may be related to specific 
generational differences in attitudes and learning 
styles. Clearly more research is needed to 
examine potential training differences and 
requirements across all driver segments.
Drivers in the second cluster, given the label of 
“ticket magnets,” were actually slightly below 
the overall average for all drivers on accident 
points. Drivers in this cluster were most 
noteworthy for averaging more than twice as 
many citations as drivers in the other two 
clusters. They also had significantly higher 
incident points, inspection points, and complaint 
calls from other motorists (MOTO) when 
compared to drivers from any other cluster. 
Profiling “Ticket Magnets” on other variables 
indicated that drivers in this cluster had the 
highest average number and percentage of 
service failures. They also had the lowest 
average number of loads hauled as well as lower 
total revenue. These findings were significantly 
lower than the averages found for drivers in the 
first cluster. The relationship of safer drivers to 
profitability is evident. These drivers also need 
additional training to stay under the radar of 
police and patrolmen. By doing so, drivers in 
this segment can avoid putting points on their 
driving records, thus helping to lower insurance 
costs for their company. They will also be less 
likely to become involved in accidents. The
challenge to the carrier is to improve the drivers 
in this cluster before they possibly slip into the 
third cluster of “accident prone” drivers.
The third cluster of drivers was given the label 
of “accident prone”. They were distinguished 
from drivers in the other two clusters because of 
their high average number of accident points. 
Their accident points were almost nine times 
greater than drivers in the “Best Overall Drivers” 
category, and more than twice as many as drivers 
in the “Ticket Magnet” cluster. Interestingly, 
drivers in this cluster averaged only slightly 
more citation points than did drivers in the “Best 
Overall Drivers” cluster. They also had the 
lowest overall average of inspection points 
across the three clusters. With the exception of 
the high average accident points, as a cluster 
they were close to the overall average on most of 
the other safety point variables. Surprisingly, 
members of this cluster had service failure 
averages, average loads hauled, and average 
percentages of serv ice failures similar to those of 
the drivers in the second “ticket magnet” cluster. 
They also had the lowest average for total 
revenue. It is clear that these drivers provide the 
most risk and challenge for the motor carrier. 
They also present their company with the most 
serious concerns related to profitability.
At the very least, the motor carrier must consider 
providing, or insisting, that these drivers receive 
additional driver training to avoid future 
accidents. This should help drivers in this 
cluster to recognize that the carrier is willing to 
further invest time and money in them. As 
previously discussed, accidents severely 
decrease motor carrier profitability (Corsi and 
Fanara, 1988; Bruning, 1989; Stephenson and 
Fox, 1996; FMCSA, 2008). The direct and 
indirect costs of accidents not only relate to 
immediate expenses, but also to long-term 
concerns of lost customers and poor public 
image (Richardson, 1994). Drivers in this 
segment are the riskiest in terms of profitability, 
and thus could be considered by the motor 
carrier to be the most expendable if any drivers
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in this segment should decide to move to another 
carrier. The motor carrier will have to evaluate 
the value of each driver in this segment against 
the potential cost of the driver being retained. 
How long ago was the last accident of each 
driver in the cluster, and does the driver seem to 
be improving, should be a few of the questions 
asked by motor carrier management. Such a 
decision will also have to be made in light of the 
prevailing economic conditions.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The results of this study have demonstrated the 
use of a micro approach for motor carriers to use 
with company databases to better understand the 
drivers in a company’s fleet. Drivers that were 
described as the “best overall” drivers can be 
identified and encouraged to act as mentors to 
other drivers who were classified as “ticket 
magnets” or “accident prone.” Some type of 
reward system should be implemented for the 
“solid and dependable drivers” to encourage 
them to be leaders in helping the other drivers to 
become “solid and dependable” drivers. The 
reward system will also encourage more risky 
drivers to become better drivers to receive the 
advantages of being in the reward system. 
Reward systems have been described by other 
researchers as being an important component of 
any motor carrier's safety strategy for drivers 
(Mejza, et. al., 2003). The goal is to establish a 
relationship between the carrier’s best drivers to 
help those that could become better drivers. It 
has been argued that drivers often jump from 
carrier to carrier because they have not become 
invested in their current carrier (Min and Emam, 
2003). Such an approach might help to get 
drivers socialized with the best drivers in a 
carrier’s fleet and help younger drivers develop 
stronger personal relationships within the 
organization. The ultimate goal of such a 
program is to increase carrier profitability by 
increasing safety and reducing the number of 
drivers who move from carrier to carrier. Direct 
and indirect safety costs are ultimately reduced.
Carrier management employing a database 
segmentation strategy can evaluate drivers who 
are considering a move to another carrier before 
they actually move. Drivers who are considered 
to be in the “best overall drivers” category 
would likely merit additional company resources 
to retain them since they are the most profitable 
drivers in the fleet. The methodology may also 
allow carriers to better track drivers at risk. By 
understanding the safety issues they present, 
company safety programs may help at risk 
drivers to better internalize the need for safety 
(Arboleda et.al., 2003) thus making them safer 
drivers. Drivers who consider moving to 
another carrier but have a continuing history of 
moving violations and/or accidents can be 
evaluated by management and thus may not 
receive as much consideration and resources to 
keep them with the firm.
One limitation for this study was that it 
examined the driver database of a single motor 
carrier. Future studies should examine the driver 
databases of additional motor carriers.
Examining other carrier databases will also 
address any regional differences that might exist 
for motor carriers based in different states and 
operating in different regions of the country. 
Future studies should also consider examining 
personality characteristics of drivers as they 
relate to drivers safety records.
If the American economy does not improve at a 
faster rate, motor carriers may be forced to 
release some drivers until the economy 
improves. Such a scenario makes it important 
for motor carriers to preserve the best driver 
talent in their fleets to have a quality start for the 
eventual economic recovery (Tuna, 2009). A 
recently released national survey has indicated 
that the economy is starting to improve and 
some fleets are now boosting driver’s pay 
(Watson and Bearth, 2010). Given that some 
drivers can contribute more to a carrier's 
profitability than others, the present study has 
provided motor carriers with a tool based upon 
usable theory to identify and retain the best
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drivers in their fleets. As drivers become aware 
of the carrier’s use of a database classification 
system, it may help motivate them to become 
safer drivers and to receive more rewards, and 
thus make the carrier more profitable. The 
purpose of employing such a database system is 
to allow the carrier to make better decisions 
about its drivers, to retain the best drivers who 
make the carrier more profitable, and to help 
those drivers in the fleet who are more of a 
safety risk to become safer drivers. In the long 
run everyone wins, including the safety of the 
general public.
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